







































Nagorno-Karabakh Dispute:  
Why Intractable Conflict for Armenia? 
 
Dağlık Karabağ Sorunu: Ermenistan için  







The conflict between Armenian and Azerbaijan around 
Nagorno-Karabakh was violent between 1988 and 1994. Nevertheless, 
Nagorno-Karabakh dispute is regarded as one of the frozen conflicts, 
which has been witnessed for many years. In order to stop and contain 
the conflict, other states and international organizations advocated 
peaceful settlement. However, the problem went through a number of 
phases and has not reached a final solution despite of many years of 
negotiation under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group. In this 
context, the objective of this paper is to understand the main impeding 
factors that prevent peaceful resolution and establishment of a      
long-lasting peace for Armenia. As a framework to analyze the case of 
Armenia-Azerbaijan dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh, this paper uses 
the “constructivist theory”, which explains national histories and 
identities as fluid, evolving, and formed over time, and which claims 
that it is mainly social relationships between agents, structures, and 
institutions that can lead to ethnic conflicts. Contrary to the 
primordialist approach, which treats ethnic groups as concrete and 
independent entities that exist inherently, the explanation of 
intractability within a constructivist framework constitutes the main 
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difference. In view of this, government policies are also constructed 
according to interstate perceptions, expectations and the concepts 
developed towards themselves and others. As a result, rather than only 
including one-dimensional “ancient hatred” paradigm; “the problem 
of security”, “image of enemy”, “other countries” involvement with 
having interests in the region”, and most importantly “internal politics” 
can be regarded as the contributors to intractability for Armenia. 




Ermenistan ile Azerbaycan arasında Dağlık Karabağ sorunu ile 
ilgili yaşanan çatışma 1988-1994 yılları arasında şiddetlenmiştir. 
Bununla birlikte, Dağlık Karabağ sorunu yıllardır tanık olunan 
dondurulmuş çatışmalardan biri olarak kabul edilmektedir. Diğer 
devletler ve uluslararası örgütler sözkonusu çatışmayı durdurmak ve 
çatışmanın yayılmasını önlemek amacıyla barışçıl çözümü 
savunmuştur. Sorun pek çok aşamadan geçmiş, ancak AGİT Minsk 
grubunun gözetiminde yıllarca süren müzakerelere rağmen nihai 
çözüme ulaşamamıştır. Bu çerçevede, makalenin temel amacı, 
Ermenistan açısından barışçıl çözümün ve uzun süreli barışın tesis 
edilmesini engelleyen belli başlı önleyici faktörleri anlamaktır. Bu 
hususlar dahilinde sözkonusu çatışmanın analizinde, ulusal tarih ve 
kimlikleri akışkan, zaman içinde oluşan ve gelişen kavramlar olarak 
ele alan ve temelde yapanlar, yapılar ve kurumlar arasındaki sosyal 
ilişkilerin etnik çatışmalara yol açtığını ileri süren “inşacı teori” 
kullanılacaktır. Etnik grupları, doğuştan ve verili bir biçimde var olan, 
somut ve bağımsız oluşumlar olarak ele alan özcü yaklaşımın aksine, 
çözümsüzlüğü inşacı çerçeveden açıklamak önemli bir farklılık 
oluşturmaktadır. Bu anlayışa göre, devletlerin politikaları da 
devletlerarası algılar, beklentiler, kendilerine ve diğerlerine karşı 
geliştirdikleri kavramlara göre kurgulanmaktadır. Sonuç olarak, 
yalnızca tek taraflı olarak “tarihsel nefret” paradigmasını vurgulamak 
yerine, “güvenlik sorunu”, “düşman imajı”, “bölgede çıkarları olan 





















diğer ülkelerin katılımı” ve en önemlisi “Ermenistan’ın iç siyaseti” 
Ermenistan açısından çatışma çözümsüzlüğüne katkıda bulunan 
faktörler olarak ele alınmaktadır. 




With the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union, 
the field of International Relations has turned to the analysis of 
increasing regional and intra-state conflicts, and the role of major and 
regional states as third party in these conflicts. The Caucasus region 
has also witnessed a number of internal and ethnic conflicts over 
territories and borders. Complex ethnic claims and disagreements, 
conflicts over sovereignty, and growing hostility over the ethnic 
minorities and their legitimate political centers have dominated the 
political agenda of the states in the Caucasus.
1
 A number of studies 
have sought to explain the roots of post-Soviet conflicts by developing 
and applying various theoretical approaches and ways in order to 
understand these conflicts. This paper focuses on the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict that firstly erupted in February 1988 and led to a war 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan between 1992 and 1994. Although a 
ceasefire was signed in 1994, the political leaders of the opposing 
nations have still not reached a solution over the region’s status. Thus, 
the intentison of the study is to evaluate the “intractability” of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.  
It is generally argued that, in the intractable conflicts, the issues 
have frozen progress towards a resolution over the decades.
2
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According to Bercovitch, intractability has some dimensions. For 
instance, intractable conflict tends to be long lasting, persisting 
decades of years. It is also characterized by present tension and 
violence. The victims of violence in the intractable conflict include 
civilians as well as combatants. There are many unresolved issues at 
stake, and although the parties may reach temporary cessations of 
violence, they cannot reach a fundamental and genuine resolution of 
their issues. Moreover, psychological manifestations of enmity and 
deep feelings of fear and hatred generally underlie the relationship 
between parties. In addition, intractable conflict attracts many actors 
and institutions that want to deal with, manage or resolve the conflict.
3
 
However, in spite of many attempts at management or resolution, only 
few of these actors or institutions are successful. 
Accordingly, after elaborating the historical background and 
mediation efforts of the conflict, the main purpose of this paper would 
be to understand the question that “What are the main impeding factors 
that prevent peaceful resolution and establishment of a long-lasting 
peace for Armenia?” As a framework to analyze the case of Armenian-
Azerbaijan dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh, this paper uses the 
“constructivist theory”, which explains national histories and identities 
as fluid, evolving, and formed over time, and which claims that it is 
mainly social relationships between agents, structures, and institutions 
that can lead to ethnic conflicts.
4
 Therefore, in this study, the factors 
which contribute to the intractability of the conflict for Armenia 
include the “problem of security”, “image of enemy”, “involment of 
other countries which have interests in the region”, and most 
importantly “internal politcs as well as historical memories of Armenia”. 
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2. Background and Analysis 
2.1. Conflict and Failure of Peace  
As mentioned before, the conflict between Armenian and 
Azerbaijan around Nagorno-Karabakh dispute was violent between 
1988 and 1994. Thousands of people died and approximately 
250,000 Armenian and 1.1 million Azeri people have become refugees 
in this conflict.
5
 In order stop and contain the conflict, other nations 
and international organizations advocated a peaceful settlement. 
Nevertheless, the problem went through a number of phases and has not 
reached a final solution despite of many years of negotiation under the 
auspices of the OSCE Minsk group, which is the main institution of the 
peace process in Nagorno-Karabakh. 
Nagorno-Karabakh is a mountainous region in the Caucasus. 
The neighboring countries, Azerbaijan and Armenia, began fighting 
over the territory after the Gorbachev’s “glasnost” and “perestroika” 
policies, and the conflict broke up in 1988. After the years of warfare 
between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, an estimated 35,000 dead and 
approximately one million refugees in both sides were left behind.
6
 
A cease fire has been held since 1994 between the sides of the conflict, 
but the conflict has not been over yet, in spite of a number of steps and 
initiatives for settlement of peace. It can be stated that the mistrust 
between the countries is still high. According to the position of the 
Azerbaijani government, part of its territory is occupied by the 
neighboring state of Armenia and, thus, the conflict is a problem 
between two sovereign states. On the other hand, to Armenian 
officials, it is a struggle for independence and self-determination by the 
Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh against Azerbaijan 
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through repeating that it has no territorial claims over Azerbaijan.
7
 
In Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has been the main organization leading 
the mediation efforts. The OSCE started its efforts in 1992 with the 
decision to arrange an international conference for settling the conflict. 
The political settlement of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh has 
been discussed within the framework of the so-called “Minsk Group”. 
In order to prepare for this conference, a group of delegates was 
formed, including representatives of Sweden, the Russian Federation, 
Italy, and other third parties, as well as representatives from Azerbaijan 
and Armenia.
8
 However, the Minsk Process has been unsuccessful in 
reaching a settlement to the conflict so far. In December 1996, the 
OSCE held a conference in Lisbon. Delegates produced a draft 
statement which was acceptable for all parties of the conflict and 
which called for a peace resolution. However, that increased the 
tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and no additional talks 
were held until 1997. In 1997, Finland’s term as co-chair of the Minsk 
Group ended and France, the United States and Russia became 
permanent co-chairs.
 9
 The new leaders of the Minsk Group presented 
a comprehensive peace proposal. The then President of Armenia Levon 
Ter-Petrosian responded favorably, but the Karabakh Armenians insisted 
that there could be no peace as long as Nagorno-Karabakh remained 
a part of Azerbaijan. In September 1997, the OSCE negotiators decided 
to handle the problem from another direction. Rather than proposing 
a comprehensive settlement plan, they would split the peace 
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negotiations into two stages.
10
 The first stage would involve military 
withdrawal; the second would involve the remaining political 
questions, such as final status. President Ter-Petrosian broke the 
Armenia’s past opposition to a step-by-step solution, but the president’s 
support for a phased peace plan caused a series of events which 
brought a political crisis. On February 3 1998, President Ter-Petrosian 
resigned. Prime Minister Robert Kocharian, an opponent of the step-
by-step peace proposal and the former President of the Nagorno 
Karabakh Republic, became President of the Republic of Armenia.
11
 
In November 1998, the Minsk Group co-chairs presented a new 
proposal that returned to the comprehensive settlement model. The 
idea would have united Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh in one 
entity, a common state, but the plan did not specify the hierarchical 
relationship, whether vertical or horizontal, between the two parts of 
the entity in order to leave room for negotiations between the parties.
12
 
The Armenians endorsed the new plan, but Azerbaijan strongly 
rejected the common state idea. Between 1999 and 2001, the then 
President of Azerbaijan Heydar Aliev and the then President of 
Armenia Robert Kocharian held a series of personal meetings, many of 
them one-on-one. For a while in 1999, it was seemed that a deal might 
be possible on the basis of the “Goble Plan” which contemplated 
a territorial exchange: Lachin for Meghri.
13
 The idea was unpopular in 
both Armenia and Azerbaijan. In January 2001, talks re-started 
between the two presidents with the encouragement of the Minsk      
co-chairs. A series of successful meetings resulted in Key West. These 
talks came close to achieving agreement, but domestic opposition in 
Azerbaijan caused Aliev to abdicate some of his concessions, and the 
Key West talks also failed. In 2002 and 2003, no progress was made 
toward peace, in part because of elections in both Armenia and 
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Azerbaijan. Robert Kocharian won re-election in Armenia, and Ilham 
Aliev was elected president of Azerbaijan. From 2004 to 2006, the 
Minsk Group conducted a series of secret meetings between the 
Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers. These meetings, known 
as the “Prague Process”, were designed to facilitate later meetings 
between the presidents. In 2005 and 2006, the co-chairs proposed 
a series of principles on which to base peace negotiations. These 
principles included renunciation of the use of force, Armenian 
withdrawal from parts of Azerbaijan surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh, 
an interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh, substantial international aid, 
the deployment of an international peacekeeping force, and mutual 
commitment to a vote on Nagorno-Karabakh’s final status after the 
return of displaced Azeris.
14
 The Prague Process resulted in four 
meetings between Presidents Robert Kocharian and Ilham Aliev, but 
none of them produced a success. In December 2006, an internal 
referendum was held in Nagorno-Karbakh, and 98.58 percent of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh population voted in favour of setting up the region 
as an independent country.
15
 Nevertheless, the vote had no 
international recognition. 
After a number of peace initiatives, in 2007, Madrid Principles 
came out of negotiations and envisioned a step-by-step resolution 
including a gradual withdrawal of forces from the territories surrounding 
Nagorno-Karabakh, a special status for Kelbajar and Lachin, and a 
referendum to determine the future legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh. 
In 2009, an updated version of the Madrid Principles was revealed in 
Italy. The OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs revealed the basic principles 
of the proposal, which included the return of the territories around 
Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan, an interim status for Nagorno-
Karabakh, a corridor to link Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia, a future 
settlement on the legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh, the right of all 
refugees and internally displaced people’s right to return home, and 
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security guarantees. According to the OSCE statement, the principles 
represented a compromise between the right to self-determination and 
the right to territorial integrity. However, the updated version got 
criticisms from the opposition in Yerevan, blaming President Serj 
Sargsyan for jeopardizing Armenia’s national interests.
16
 
It can be argued that an influential group of principal powers, in 
which the US, Russia and the EU dominate, plays the key role in the 
OSCE when it comes to the issue of conflict resolution. However, 
many years of peace talks through the medium of the OSCE Minsk 
Group have failed to produce any legitimate agreements. Only few 
attempts made by Russia, the US and France produced little outcome.  
So far, the good intentions expressed in the documents of the OSCE 
summits have not been implemented and they still remain on paper for 
many reasons, including the sides’ refusal to cooperate, the conflict 
resolutions being objectively complex nature, etc.
17
 In that respect, 
Minsk group stated that their countries stand ready to assist the sides, 
but the responsibility for putting an end to the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict remains with them. According to the Presidents of the OSCE 
Minsk Group Co-Chair Countries, they strongly believe that further 
delay in reaching a balanced agreement on the framework for 
a comprehensive peace is unacceptable and they urge the leaders of 
Azerbaijan and Armenia to focus with renewed energy on the issues 
that remain unresolved.
18
 On the other hand, Armenian officials make 
their statements in the opposing way and they charge Azerbaijan 
relating the intractability of the situation. According to them,  
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“Despite the negotiations held within the framework of the 
OSCE Minsk Group which is the only internationally 
mandated format on conflict settlement, and the agreement 
to carry out negotiations within the Minsk process, 
Azerbaijan, distorting the nature and main reasons of the 
consequences of the conflict, takes attempts to involve other 
international organizations in the settlement and initiates 
parallel processes hindering the negotiation process and 
having campaign objectives especially in the United Nations 
General Assembly and the Council of Europe, too.”
19
 
As a result, many years have passed since the Armenians and 
Azerbaijanis signed a ceasefire, but the absence of active warfare has 
not created a peace. Accordingly, the following part of this paper 
explores the “intractability” in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by 
displaying the factors influencing the progress of conflict potential. 
According to Philip Gamaghelyan, the “intractability” of the conflict 
largely originates from the desire of parties to have a sense of the final 
status of the region, rather than addressing the underlying problems.
20
 
Within the framework for understanding the case of Armenian- 
Azerbaijan dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh, contrary to primordial 
arguments, “constructivist theory” will be used, which considers 
national histories and identities as fluid, evolving, and formed over 
time. Through using the explanations of constructivist arguement, the 
following part of the study will try to address the question of “What 
are the main impeding factors that prevent peaceful resolution and 
establishment of a long-lasting peace for Armenia?”  
 
 
                                                     
19 The Official Site of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, 
http://www.mfa.am/en/artsakh/#a3.  
20 Philip Gamaghelyan, “Intractability of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: A Myth or 
A Reality?” Peace & Conflict Monitor, Special Report, (July 2005): 1. 





















3. The Main Impeding Factors that Prevent Peaceful 
Resolution and Establishment of Long-Lasting Peace for Armenia 
3.1. Constructivist Outline 
In conflict studies, the notion of ethnicity is viewed and 
interpreted based on particular theoretical approaches to conflicts. The 
two political science perspectives on conflict, which is focused on 
here, are primordialism and constructivism. Firstly, primordialist 
approach argues that ethnic and racial identities are fundamental and 
immutable, arising from the congruities of blood, speech, and custom. 
Human beings do not actively choose their ethnic identities. Rather, 
they inherit them when they are born into communities that speak 
certain languages, practice particular religions, and follow specific 
social customs.
21
 According to this view, there is an inherent or primordial 
animosity between two camps that causes conflict. Primordialists 
assume that the actors have one main identity and that the way 
religions shape that identity is fixed over time. In that sense, 
a primordialist appraoch views the Nagorno- Karabakh territory as 
being fixed, and bound to a particular ethnic identity; as the cradle of 
a group’s linguistic, cultural or religious origins. Since both Azerbaijanis 
and Armenians living in the region make a claim based on this idea, 
the conflict can be seen as the result of ancient grievances between the 
two groups as embedded hatreds that are “permanent and ineradicable”.
22
 
It can be argued that ethnicity itself is an important factor in the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict; however, it is not appropriate to call it 
exclusively a primordial ethnic conflict.
23
 Nevertheless, as Kuburas 
argues, the primordial approach ignores the periods of relative peace 
and stability between two groups, and it does not account for other 
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factors that are beyond the ancient or historical presence of people. It 
can be argued that primordial approach also underestimates the role of 
the political elite and their logic of perceived threats and opportunities 
under which elites make the choices in political crises.
24
 
On the other hand, constructivism is based on social interactions. 
Constructivism is one of the most influential contexts of the immediate 
post-Cold War period that is related with the way agents and structures 
co-constitute each other, the socially constructed nature of actors and 
their identities and interests, and the importance of ideational, 
normative and discursive factors in the shaping of international 
political reality. It is concerned with the beliefs, attitudes and 
perception of parties in conflict, the formation of regimes, the 
communicative-discursive strategies adopted by intermediaries in 
conflict, the role of language, memory, and the actions that individuals 
and groups can take to shape their lives and to resolve their conflicts.
 25
  
Broadly speaking, constructivists see ethnic identities and ethnic 
conflict as the product of concrete historical processes. According to 
them, ethnic identities are not social givens, but they are produced 
through processes of socialization and acculturation.
26
 Rather than 
primordial ties, ethnic groups are social constructs generated and 
maintained by specific historical processes such as the distribution of 
official identity cards. Although ethnic identities are actually produced 
by historical processes, they are not necessarily perceived in this way. 
Over time, ethnic identities gain widespread social acceptance. 
Individuals regard ethnic identities as immutable social facts and have 
difficulty separating their personal identities from those of the groups 
to which they belong. Unlike primordialists, who refer to emotions or 
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strategic calculations, constructivists focus on external processes in 
explaining the politicization of ethnic identities.
27
  
In addition, constructivism underlines the crucial role of 
ideational structures playing part in shaping social actors’ identities 
and, consequently, realities. In that sense, ideational structures ascribe 
meaning to actors’ identities through infusing them with a sense of 
who they are, what social roles they are expected to play, and how they 
should relate to other actors around them. In this way, actors’ identities 
–that are the products of the ideational structures in which they are 
embedded- will shape their perception of the material world, define 
their interests, and determine their behavior towards other actors.
 28
 
Despite the fact that primordial arguments could not explain 
what caused the violence in this region alone, it has become an 
important element in the construction of nationalist sentiment needed 
to mobilize it. However, contrary to primordialism, constructivism 
does not view ethnicity as conflict generating. Rather, it is mainly 
social relationships between agents, structures, and institutions that can 
lead to ethnic conflicts.
29
 In addition, emotions, memory, and ideas can 
influence identity and behavior of the people. Constructivism also 
emphasizes the ways in which group identities emerge and change over 
time.
30
 This theoretical approach suggests that peaceful co-existence 
between ethnic groups, one that is based on trust, is possible.  
Consequently, for constructivists, ethnicity can be transformed 
from a resource and a cause of conflict to a form that can construct 
trust between groups. Confidence building measures that provide 
information between groups can resolve the security dilemma in ethnic 
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 Because of the fact that identity plays a significant role in 
social conflict, it is fundamental to how individuals and collectivities 
see and understand themselves in conflict. Accordingly, identities are 
created and transformed in processes of social struggle. Understanding 
how identities impact conflict, conflict processes, and the ways they 
are constructed within conflicts, informs about the emergence, 
escalation, and potential transformation of social conflicts.
32
 
3.2. Intractability for Armenia 
As mentioned before, intractable conflicts are regarded as 
conflicts that persist because they appear impossible to resolve. They 
can emerge from a  number of underlying reasons such as moral and 
identity differences, high-stakes resources, or struggles for power and 
self-determination.
33
 Although many different factors can be displayed 
that strenghten this kind of conflicts according to different cases, there 
are some major characteristics of intractable conflicts in terms of 
actors, duration, issues, relationship, geopolitics, and management. 
First of all, in terms of actors, intractable conflicts involve states or 
other actors with a long sense of historical grievance, and a strong 
desire to redress or avenge these. In terms of duration, intractable 
conflicts take place over a long period of time. In terms of issues, 
intractable conflicts involve intangible issues such as identity, 
sovereignty, or values and beliefs. In terms of relationships, intractable 
conflicts involve polarized perceptions of hostility and enmity, and 
behavior that is violent and destructive. In terms of geopolitics, 
intractable conflicts usually take place where buffer states exist 
between major power blocks or civilizations. In terms of management, 
intractable conflicts resist many conflict management efforts and have 
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a history of failed peace-making efforts.
34
 
With respect to Nagorno Karabakh conflict, it can be asserted 
that neither country is trying to enforce a change in the environment 
towards peace. It is also important to underline the fact that internal 
politics also dictate the behaviors of the parties of the conflict. There is 
a sense that both sides are playing to emotions rather than towards a 
real settlement.
35
 The factors like corruption, monopoly over resources, 
and lack of business opportunity have forced millions of people to 
emigrate to Russia and to Western Europe. Moreover, 
authoritarianism, lack of independent media in both countries prevents 
public debate of options for peace. As Mehtiyev argues, propaganda of 
hatred and military solution to the conflict dominates in Armenia's 
approach. In the analysis of the main impeding factors that prevent 
peaceful resolution and establishment of a long-lasting peace for 
Armenia, there are some important determinant points which should be 
underlined. As being the major impeding factors, “ancient hatred 
discourse”, “the problem of security”, “image of enemy”, “involment 
of other countries which have interests in the region”, and “internal 
politcs” would try to be eleborated in the following part of the study. 
First of all, the Armenians are linked in their shared identity, 
which is formed by the collective memory. This “socially constructed” 
selection from history provides a shared self-image.
36
 In this self-
image, national identity is generally expressed in terms of conflict with 
the enemy. In this sense, at its cornerstone, there is a deep hatred 
against anything Turkish, which is traced back to the events in 
1915 under the rule of Ottoman Empire. According to Armenian 
perspective, since the basic needs have been violated throughout 
history, Armenians are still in the state of deprivation but in a new 
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kind. They claim that it is the trauma of “Armenian Genocide” of 
1915 on the territory of Ottoman Turkey.
37
 Many still perceive the 
conflict as an attempt to repeat what they called as the genocide. Thus, 
the process of victimization Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is considered 
as not only an opportunity to prevent a new genocide, but also 
a punishment for those who tried to commit it.
38
  
The problem of security is another important factor defining the 
potential of conflict.  According to Armenian perspective, one of the 
main causes of Nagorno-Karbakh conflict was the perception that the 
need for security of the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh is 
not satisfied.
39
 At the beginning of the conflict, territory was regarded 
as the main satisfier of security of the Armenian population in 
Nagorno-Karabakh. However, with the prolongation of the negotiation 
process over the conflict and international mediations, it was 
understood that conflicts having long roots cannot be solved by 
standard settlement models. Moreover, it is argued that the key 
objectives of the parties which directly involved changed over time. 
Accordingly, with respect to Armenia, 
 The evolving Armenian leadership of Nagorno-Karabakh 
initially moved away from demanding the transfer of the territory to 
Armenia, to a temporary transfer over the Russian Soviet Federal 
Socialist Republic or, alternatively, to direct administration from 
Moscow. The demand for -from the Armenian point of view- a re-
unification with Armenia was later changed to the current official 
viewpoint of independent statehood. 
 The positions of the Armenian Karabakh Committee and 
later leadership of independent Armenia also changed over time, and 
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was only different from the Karabakh positions: from transfer of the 
Autonomous Oblast to unification with Armenia after independence, 
and finally to the de facto independence of Nagorno-Karabakh. For 
some time, the question of official acknowledgment of the Nagorno-
Karabakh Republic as an independent state by Armenia remained a 
sticking point between factions in the first government of Armenia.
40
 
According to Ayuns, innovative and creative ways of conflict 
resolution should be attempted. It is generally suggested that, in order 
to satisfy the human security, the peace should formally be 
strengthened by institutionalization. The problems about democratization 
of the Armenian society and the issue of economic development are 
other major sources of the problems, which can increase the level of 
the security problem. 
Furthermore, the image of enemy, negative sterotypes and 
mistrust also create negative impacts on Armenian perspective towards 
the solution of the problem. According to Koehler and Zürcher, in 
Armenia, the interpretation of the conflict first switched to 
a simplifying nationalist paradigm in public discourse. In the Armenian 
case, as mentioned above, the most important qualifying criterion was 
the normative and internally unquestionable code that connected 
national identity to the historical experience of 1915 events.
41
 In that 
sense, any problem connected to Nagorno-Karabakh is connected to 
the question of the existence of the people. 
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the environmental 
groups turned into nationalist organisations in Armenia. The most 
influential one, the Karabakh Committee, was established by unknown 
intellectuals with strong nationalistic feelings under the leadership of 
Levon Ter-Petrosyan. The nationalistic discourse of the Karabakh 
Committee established a historical link between the events of 1915 in 
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the Ottoman Empire and violence in Sumgait by equalising 
Azerbaijanis and Turks.
42
 The image of enemy, “the Turk”, is strictly 
emphasized in Armenian society and transferred towards Azerbaijanis:
43
 
“The Muslim and the Turk were historically “the other” for 
Armenia. Turkishness was considered immoral, dirty and 
violent. “Anti-Turkishness” was, thereforei accepted as a 
“natural” and inherently “good” attitude. Of course, some 
Armenians and Turks maintained good and even friendly 
relations at a personal level. However, such personal links 
did not translate to collective rapprochement.”
44
 
According to Ayuns, overcoming the image of enemy and 
negative stereotypes among the societies is possible through 
communications between the communities at both local and regional 
levels. For transformation of the existing mistrust and lack of confidence, 
the involvement of civil society is also seen as a necessary step.  
The role of mass-media is also significant as being one of the 
most important links between the communities that can promote this 
process. The media can publicize the principles of moral norms, and 
can act to enforce those norms by publicizing violations. They can act 
as a go-between for parties who lack any other means of 
communication. The media can also educate the parties about each 
other’s interests, needs, and core values, and help to confirm the 
parties’ claims of transparency.
45
 They can help to undermine harmful 
stereotypes and promote rehumanization of the parties. 
Nevertheless, as Ayuns asserts, media plays a destructive role in 
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the current peace process, and negatively influences the conflict 
through labeling the other as “enemy”. Azerbaijanis are predominantly 
represented as “barbarians”, “aggressors”, “traitors”, etc. to the 
Armenian society by the media. Moreover, it can be argued that the 
low level of democratization of societies also relates to the mass 
media, since it mainly represents the mainstream ideology and 
dominantly a tool of propaganda in the hands of authorities.
46
 Apart 
from these factors, official statements of the leaders, statements in 
media, and their role in the decision-making process are also 
significant in shaping the Armenian perspective. According to the 
Armenian Foreign Ministry statements, there are some factors that 
prevent the establishment of confidence-building measures among the 
sides which are mainly caused by Azerbaijan. For them, although no 
nation is perceived by the Armenian people as enemies, Azerbaijan’s 
leadership does not miss a chance to declare all Armenians murderers, 
barbarians, fascists, and Azerbaijan’s enemies. The official documents 
claim that Azerbaijan bans individuals of Armenian descent to visit 
Azerbaijan, regardless of their nationality and place of residence. The 
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia states 
that Azerbaijan is the only country, which acts against the process of 
the normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations, because it will result 




In addition, one of the most important factors determining the 
conflict potential is the third countries’ interests in the region. It can be 
claimed that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has attracted the attention 
of many influential external actors. The countries involved in the 
mediation process such as Minsk Group co-chairs from Russia, 
USA and France, as well as neighbours of the South Caucasian 
countries like Turkey and Iran have mentioned their interests about the 
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resolution of conflict and regional development perspective.
48
 Also, 
supranational and international organizations like the EU, NATO, and 
OSCE, and local and international peace-building NGOs have also 
involved within the peace process of this intractable conflict. NATO 
has included its “Partnership for Peace” program and the EU offered 
the parties membership in “the European Neighborhood Policy”. 
Nevertheless, the public position of some other actors like Georgia and 
of British Petroleum and American, Norwegian, Turkish, Italian, 
French and Japanese oil companies (BP&Co), which develop the 
Azerbaijani oil fields, is regarded as being neutral toward the conflict.
49
 
There have also been a number of other actors of the conflicting 
parties and their outspoken supporters. On the one side, there are the 
Armenians of Nagorno Karabakh, who claim that they would choose to 
start a new cycle of violence rather than agreeing to anything short of 
independence.
50
 They are supported by the Armenian government, 
Armenian public, intellectual and business circles, Armenian refugees, 
and Armenian Diaspora. On the other side, there is the Azerbaijani 
government that threatens to retake Nagorno-Karabakh by force if 
a solution that satisfies its demands is not reached.
51
 It is supported by 
the Azeri public, intellectual and business circles, Azeri refugees and 
IDPs (internally displaced people), and Turkey. 
Among these international and regional actors, for Armenia, 
Turkey plays a negative role since it pursues one-sided position that 
has been in favor of Azerbaijan in the conflict resolution process.  
However, Ayuns argues that, on the other side, Turkey has its positive 
role. According to him, violent conflict is not in Turkey’s agenda since 
it is interested in stability and security of the region as a result of the 
gas and oil projects and accession demands to the EU.  
                                                     
48 Ibid, 6. 
49 Gamaghelyan, “Intractability Of The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: A Myth Or 
A Reality?”, 5. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 





















Furthermore, internal politics and the political factors, which 
include the level of democratization, political will, public support and 
the negotiation process, also have great influence on Armenia. 
However, it can be argued that Armenia has an authoritarian political 
culture, which negatively affects the democratization process. The 
leaders are not recognized by the public as legitimate, which means 
that any agreement they reach regarding the resolution of conflict 
would be refused by the society.
52
  As Koehler and Zürcher argue, 
Armenia has important institutional weaknesses in the sense that the 
institutions defining statehood have been under the influence of 
informal pressure groups, networks, and institutions. In this system, 




As a result, the leaders do not exercise strong political will for 
concessions and compromise in Armenia. The semi-authoritarian 
political environment, deficit of resources of local NGOs, patriarchal 
mentality of the societies are regarded as some of the internal factors in 
Armenia which prevent the development of civil society involvement 
in the peace process and conflict transformation.  
According to Gahramanova, the level of political opportunities 
in Nagorno-Karabakh case such as, liberalization, glasnost, and 
weakening of state structures, does not automatically generate violence. 
Structural contexts such as lack of power-sharing, dialogue, bargaining 
methods, and regional economic cooperation in the South Caucasus 
stimulated the conflict eruption. At this point, he defines the conflict as 
“elite-initiated” one, which swept through the whole society. 
At this point, the role of “public diplomacy” in finding ways to 
resolve the conflict which encompasses civil society and leaders who 
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can establish close relations with the society can be an important 
matter. It could be a crucial way for building relationships that 
comprises of understanding the needs of other countries, cultures, and 
peoples, communicating the points of view, and correcting 
misperceptions. The use of public diplomacy can increase people’s 
familiarity with one’s country through making them think about it, 
updating their images, turning around unfavorable opinions; it can 
increase people’s appreciation of one’s country through creating 
positive perceptions, getting others to see the issues of global 
importance from the same perspective; it can engage people with one’s 
country through strengthening ties from education reform to scientific 
co-operation; encouraging people to see the country of the other as an 
attractive destination for tourism, study, distance learning.
54
 The 
involvement of NGO, business, and community leaders in the peace 
process is considered as important steps in order to promote conflict 
transformation, and overcome negative experience.
55
  
As it can be seen from the above-mentioned factors, there are 
a lot of reasons which prevent peaceful resolution and establishment of 
a long-lasting peace for Armenia. Unlike primordialist arguments that 
support the interpretation of ethnic war as primarily about passion, it 
can be stated that identities are often new, often mutable, and always in 
existence as the result of some ideology that defines who is a member 
of an ethnic group which is “socially constructed.”
56
 In other words, 
constructivists allow the possibility that, in some situations, group 
identities can be fluid and changed or new identities can be created, 
whereas, in primordialism, they are more difficult to change. 
Therefore, in the case of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, it is important 
to try and understand the possibilities for political change, particularly 
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conflict situations and the role of agents in reducing violent conflict in 
both Armenian and Azerbaijani sides. 
Rather than the outcome of substantial and fixed ethnic 
identities; and only including one-dimensional ‘ancient hatred’ 
paradigm; “the problem of security”, “image of enemy”, “involment of 
other countries which have interests in the region”, and “internal 
politics” can be regarded as the contributors to intractability for 
Armenia. Moreover, it can be argued that ruling elites exploit the 
conflict to legitimise their rule in the eyes of their citizens and to 
promulgate their undemocratic regimes through constructing the 
representations of danger and insecurities.
57
 The narrative of the 
conflict has identified the ‘other side’ as a ‘threat’ to its identity. 
In addition, history has been instrumentalised as it played a significant 
role in strengthening the collective identity. Furthermore, history is 
manipulated to justify the claim of ‘we were on this territory first’ to 
exclude ‘the other’ from the constructed space of homeland. The 
outcome of this narrative is that the state will feel compelled to resist 
and combat the ‘threatening other’ to protect the physical borders as 
well as the boundaries of the nation-state identity.
58
 Both Armenia and 
Azerbaijan are states with institutional weaknesses where the institutions 
and procedures defining statehood have, in effect, been taken over by 
informal pressure groups, networks and institutions that are not taken 
into account by the way the state is formally constituted. The fact that 
influential patrons occupy key positions in the state and keep services 
to some degree functioning which leads to pursuing network-interests 
rather than common or national interests.
59
 Also, according to Özkan, 
the Karabakh issue mainly determines political discourse in both 
Armenia and Azerbaijan. Ruling elites use this conflict as a tool to 
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restrict the democratic rights and to justify their authoritarian rules. 
The concentration of power in the presidents and the lack of civil 
institutions have subversive effects on the future of the societies.
60
 As 
a result of all these processes, a stronger relationship between parties is 
strongly necessary in order to  resolve the conflict. Additionally, third 
parties can explore how to overcome obstacles, and break stalemates in 
order to continue negotiations, make accommodations, and conclude 
agreements. Powerful third parties can use persuasion, reward, and 
well-timed concessions to save face for each party, de-escalate the 
conflict, and get both parties to reach agreement. 
4. Conclusion 
In short, it can be argued that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is 
a significant event in Armenia's foreign policy and it is also one of the 
difficult conflicts in the South Caucasian area. Armenia has been 
insisting on self-determination to the Armenian people of Nagorno-
Karabakh, while Azerbaijan defines the conflict as a problem of 
territorial integrity. Accordingly, this paper tried to focus on the 
possible impeding factors that prevent peaceful resolution and 
establishment of a long-lasting peace for Armenia. Apart from the 
primordial discourses and claims, other factors such as “the effect of 
historical memories”, “security problem”, “image of enemy”, “third 
countries’ role”, and “internal politcs” were tried to be eleborated in 
this study. 
It can be stated that both sides of the conflict need a resolution 
for this complicated and emotional issue. As Ogenasyan underlines, 
collective memories, fears, and ancient histories continue to promote 
alienation between Armenians and Azerbaijanis. Moreover, the major 
attempts to resolve the conflict, including international mediation, have 
not reached a success. All of these dimensions have turned the tension 
into an intractable conflict. 
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However, as mentioned above, constructivism suggests that 
peaceful co-existence between ethnic groups, one that is based on trust, 
is possible. At this stage, it can be helpful to continue opening more 
space for engaging dialogue which would address concerns, fears, and 
mutual interests of the parties involved in the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict. For parts of the conflict, the goal of the dialogue should be to 
decrease stereotypes and deep biases as well as to build trust at the 
personal level.
61
 It is important to understand which common interests 
can bring these groups together. The strategy of promoting educational 
and cultural efforts maintained at the local, regional, and international 
levels could also have an instrumental role.
62
 Moreover, international 
community also have essential role in supporting the transformation of 
this conflict into the peace process. Thus, it is very important to 
overcome the lack of trust between the negotiating sides, domestic 
pressure, elite discourse, and the lack of pressure from international powers. 
In the future, there may appear some options of for direction of 
the process. According to discussions, on the one hand, future 
strengthening of authoritarian tendencies and same “ancient hatred” 
discourse will destroy the hopes for management of the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict. On the other hand, development of civil society 
gives some motivation for peace process and conflict settlement.  
Consequently, there may emerge some possible ways, which can 
contribute to the process of conflict management. However, the conflict 
over Nagorno-Karabakh is very complex and it is very difficult to have 
a full understanding through confining the issue into one paper. Therefore, 
this is only one aspect of interpretation of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict through both underlining the effect of the history and some 
internal mechanisms that prevent the solution for Armenian state. 
 
 
                                                     

























Soğuk Savaş’ın sona ermesi ve Sovyetler Birliği'nin dağılmasının 
ardından, Uluslararası İlişkiler alanında bölgesel ve devlet içinde 
meydana gelen çatışmalar ile ilgili pek çok çalışma yapılmıştır. 
Bununla beraber, büyük güçler ve bölgesel devletler gibi, üçüncü 
tarafların söz konusu çatışmalar içindeki rolleri ile ilgili yapılan 
analizlerde de bir artış gözlemlenmiştir. Bu süreç içinde, Kafkasya 
Bölgesi de toprakları ve sınırları üzerinde bir dizi iç ve etnik çatışmaya 
tanıklık etmiştir. Karmaşık etnik talepler ve anlaşmazlıklar, egemenlik 
üzerine yaşanan çatışmalar ve etnik azınlıklar ile onların meşru siyasi 
merkezleri arasında büyüyen düşmanlıklar Kafkasya’daki devletlerin 
siyasi gündeminde hâkim olan belli başlı sorunları oluşturmuştur. 
Sovyetler Birliği’nin dağılması sonrasında yapılan pek çok çalışmada 
bu tarz çatışmaları anlamak ve söz konusu çatışmaların kökenlerini 
açıklamak için çeşitli teorik yaklaşımlar uygulanmıştır. Bu çerçevede, 
bu çalışmada, Şubat 1988’de patlak veren ve 1992 ile 1994 yılında 
Ermenistan ve Azerbaycan arasında bir savaşa yol açan Dağlık 
Karabağ ihtilafı üzerinde durulmaktadır. 1994 yılında imzalanan 
ateşkese rağmen, karşıt iki ülkenin siyasi liderleri hâlâ bölgenin statüsü 
üzerinde bir çözüme ulaşamamışlardır. Bundan dolayı, çalışmanın 
amacı Dağlık Karabağ çatışmasının “çözümsüzlüğünü” değerlendirmektir. 
Azerbaycan ile Ermenistan arasındaki çatışmaların temelinde,  her iki 
ülke arasındaki “dondurulmuş çatışma zemini” konumundaki “Dağlık 
Karabağ Sorunu” bulunmaktadır. Genel olarak incelendiğinde, çözümsüz 
çatışmalarda bazı temel boyutlar mevcuttur. Söz konusu çatışmalar 
onlarca yıldır devam eder ve uzun ömürlü olma eğilimindedir; ayrıca 
her zaman gerilim ve şiddet niteliğine sahiptir. Bu tür çatışmalarda 
savaşan askerlerin yanı sıra siviller de şiddete maruz kalmaktadırlar. 
Bununla beraber, şiddet geçici olarak durdurulsa dahi karşıt taraflar 
aralarındaki sorunlarla ilgili nihai çözüme ulaşamamaktadırlar. Ayrıca, 
taraflar arasındaki ilişkide düşmanlık, korku ve nefret duyguları 
hâkimdir. Çözümsüz çatışmalarda, taraflar arasındaki sorunu çözmek 
ve anlaşmayı sağlamak isteyen birçok aktör ve kurum mevcut olsa da, 
yapılan girişimlerin pek çoğu başarısızlıkla sonuçlanmaktadır.  
 





















Çözümsüz ve dondurulmuş çatışmalara örnek teşkil eden Dağlık 
Karabağ sorunu da pek çok aşamadan geçmesine ve AGİT Minsk 
grubunun gözetiminde yıllarca süren müzakerelere rağmen nihai 
çözüme ulaşamamıştır. Bu çerçevede çalışmanın temel amacı, Ermenistan 
adına barışçıl çözümün ve uzun süreli barışın tesis edilmesini 
engelleyen belli başlı önleyici faktörleri anlamaktır. Bu hususlar 
dâhilinde söz konusu çatışmanın analizinde, ulusal tarih ve kimlikleri 
akışkan, zaman içinde oluşan ve gelişen olarak ele alan ve temel olarak 
yapanlar, yapılar ve kurumlar arasındaki sosyal ilişkilerin etnik 
çatışmalara yol açtığını öngören “inşacı teori” kullanılmıştır. Çatışma 
çözümlerinde özcü (primordialism) görüşü benimseyenler, kimliğin 
tarihi ve sosyal koşullardan bağımsız bir varlığa sahip olduğunu, 
ekonomik ve kurumsal düzenlemelerin bu varlığı yok edemeyeceğini 
ve bireylerin siyasi temayülleri üzerinde özcü bağlılıkların önemli bir 
role sahip olduğunu ileri sürmektedir. Buna göre etnik gruplar, 
doğuştan ve verili bir biçimde var olan somut ve bağımsız oluşumlardır. 
Kimliği oluşturan bağlılıklar, ekonomi, siyaset, coğrafya ve tarih gibi 
başka faktörlerle açıklanamaz. Bu çalışmada çerçeve olarak ele alınan 
inşacı kurama göre ise, aktörlerin davranışlarında esas olan 
çevrelerindeki nesnelerin taşıdıklarını düşündükleri anlamlardır. Bu 
anlayışa göre, devletlerin politikaları da devletlerarası algılar, 
beklentiler, kendilerine ve diğerlerine karşı geliştirdikleri kavramlara 
göre kurgulanmaktadır. Bu aşamada, düşünce ve kimliklerin nasıl 
oluşturulduğu, nasıl bir dönüşüm geçirdikleri ve devlet tutumlarını 
anlamada bunların ne tür etkileri olduğu gibi hususlar önem arz 
etmektedir. Bu çalışmada, Ermenistan için çatışma çözümsüzlüğüne 
katkıda bulunan faktörler olarak “güvenlik sorunu”, “düşman imajı“, 
“bölgede çıkarları olan diğer ülkelerin katılımı” ve en önemlisi 
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